Delivered in a sermon on social justice four decades ago, Martin Luther King's words retain a powerful resonance. At the start of the 21 st Century, we too are confronted with the "fi erce urgency" of a crisis that links today and tomorrow. Th at crisis is climate change. It is still a preventable crisis-but only just. Th e world has less than a decade to change course. No issue merits more urgent attention-or more immediate action.
Climate change is the defi ning human development issue of our generation. All development is ultimately about expanding human potential and enlarging human freedom. It is about people developing the capabilities that empower them to make choices and to lead lives that they value. Climate change threatens to erode human freedoms and limit choice. It calls into question the Enlightenment principle that human progress will make the future look better than the past.
Th e early warning signs are already visible. Today, we are witnessing at fi rst hand what could be the onset of major human development reversal in our lifetime. Across developing countries, millions of the world's poorest people are already being forced to cope with the impacts of climate change. Th ese impacts do not register as apocalyptic events in the full glare of world media attention. Th ey go unnoticed in fi nancial markets and in the measurement of world gross domestic product (GDP). But increased exposure to drought, to more intense storms, to fl oods and environmental stress is holding back the eff orts of the world's poor to build a better life for themselves and their children.
Climate change will undermine international eff orts to combat poverty. Seven years ago, political leaders around the world gathered to set targets for accelerated progress in human development. Th e Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) defi ned a new ambition for 2015. Much has been achieved, though many countries remain off track. Climate change is hampering eff orts to deliver the MDG promise. Looking to the future, the danger is that it will stall and then reverse progress built-up over generations not just in cutting extreme poverty, but in health, nutrition, education and other areas.
Overview Fighting climate change: human solidarity in a divided world
How the world deals with climate change today will have a direct bearing on the human development prospects of a large section of humanity. Failure will consign the poorest 40 percent of the world's population-some 2.6 billion people-to a future of diminished opportunity. It will exacerbate deep inequalities within countries. And it will undermine eff orts to build a more inclusive pattern of globalization, reinforcing the vast disparities between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'.
In today's world, it is the poor who are bearing the brunt of climate change. Tomorrow, it will be humanity as a whole that faces the risks that come with global warming. Th e rapid build-up of greenhouse gases in the Earth's atmosphere is fundamentally changing the climate forecast for future generations. We are edging towards 'tipping points'. Th ese are unpredictable and non-linear events that could open the door to ecological catastrophes-accelerated collapse of the Earth's great ice sheets being a case in point-that will transform patterns of human settlement and undermine the viability of national economies. Our generation may not live to see the consequences. But our children and their grandchildren will have no alternative but to live with them. Aversion to poverty and inequality today, and to catastrophic risk in the future provides a strong rationale for urgent action.
Some commentators continue to cite uncertainty over future outcomes as grounds for a limited response to climate change. Th at starting point is fl awed. Th ere are indeed many unknowns: climate science deals in probability and risk, not in certainties. However, if we value the well-being of our children and grandchildren, even small risks of catastrophic events merit an insurance-based precautionary approach. And uncertainty cuts both ways: the risks could be greater than we currently understand.
Climate change demands urgent action now to address a threat to two constituencies with a little or no political voice: the world's poor and future generations. It raises profoundly important questions about social justice, equity and human rights across countries and generations. In the Human Development Report 2007/2008 we address these questions. Our starting point is that the battle against climate change canand must-be won. Th e world lacks neither the fi nancial resources nor the technological capabilities to act. If we fail to prevent climate change it will be because we were unable to foster the political will to cooperate.
Such an outcome would represent not just a failure of political imagination and leadership, but a moral failure on a scale unparalleled in history. During the 20 th Century failures of political leadership led to two world wars. Millions of people paid a high price for what were avoidable catastrophes. Dangerous climate change is the avoidable catastrophe of the 21 st Century and beyond. Future generations will pass a harsh judgement on a generation that looked at the evidence on climate change, understood the consequences and then continued on a path that consigned millions of the world's most vulnerable people to poverty and exposed future generations to the risk of ecological disaster.
Ecological interdependence
Climate change is diff erent from other problems facing humanity-and it challenges us to think diff erently at many levels. Above all, it challenges us to think about what it means to live as part of an ecologically interdependent human community.
Ecological interdependence is not an abstract concept. We live today in a world that is divided at many levels. People are separated by vast gulfs in wealth and opportunity. In many regions, rival nationalisms are a source of confl ict. All too oft en, religious, cultural and ethnic identity are treated as a source of division and diff erence from others. In the face of all these diff erences, climate change provides a potent reminder of the one thing that we share in common. It is called planet Earth. All nations and all people share the same atmosphere. And we only have one.
Global warming is evidence that we are overloading the carrying capacity of the Earth's atmosphere. Stocks of greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere are accumulating at an unprecedented rate.
Current concentrations have reached 380
Climate change provides a potent reminder of the one thing that we share in common. It is called planet Earth. All nations and all people share the same atmosphere parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2 e) exceeding the natural range of the last 650,000 years. In the course of the 21 st Century, average global temperatures could increase by more than 5°C.
To put that fi gure in context, it is equivalent to the change in temperature since the last ice age-an era in which much of Europe and North America was under more than one kilometre of ice. Th e threshold for dangerous climate change is an increase of around 2°C. Th is threshold broadly defi nes the point at which rapid reversals in human development and a drift towards irreversible ecological damage would become very diffi cult to avoid.
Behind the numbers and the measurement is a simple overwhelming fact. We are recklessly mismanaging our ecological interdependence. In eff ect, our generation is running up an unsustainable ecological debt that future generations will inherit. We are drawing down the stock of environmental capital of our children. Dangerous climate change will represent the adjustment to an unsustainable level of greenhouse gas emissions.
Future generations are not the only constituency that will have to cope with a problem they did not create. Th e world's poor will suff er the earliest and most damaging impacts. Rich nations and their citizens account for the overwhelming bulk of the greenhouse gases locked in the Earth's atmosphere. But, poor countries and their citizens will pay the highest price for climate change.
Th e inverse relationship between responsibility for climate change and vulnerability to its impacts is sometimes forgotten. Public debate in rich nations increasingly highlights the threat posed by rising greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries. Th at threat is real. But it should not obscure the underlying problem. Mahatma Gandhi once refl ected on how many planets might be needed if India were to follow Britain's pattern of industrialization. We are unable to answer that question. However, we estimate in this Report that if all of the world's people generated greenhouse gases at the same rate as some developed countries, we would need nine planets.
While the world's poor walk the Earth with a light carbon footprint they are bearing the brunt of unsustainable management of our ecological interdependence. In rich countries, coping with climate change to date has largely been a matter of adjusting thermostats, dealing with longer, hotter summers, and observing seasonal shifts. Cities like London and Los Angeles may face flooding risks as sea levels rise, but their inhabitants are protected by elaborate flood defence systems. By contrast, when global warming changes weather patterns in the Horn of Africa, it means that crops fail and people go hungry, or that women and young girls spend more hours collecting water. And, whatever the future risks facing cities in the rich world, today the real climate change vulnerabilities linked to storms and floods are to be found in rural communities in the great river deltas of the Ganges, the Mekong and the Nile, and in sprawling urban slums across the developing world.
Th e emerging risks and vulnerabilities associated with climate change are the outcomes of physical processes. But they are also a consequence of human actions and choices. Th is is another aspect of ecological interdependence that is sometimes forgotten. When people in an American city turn on the airconditioning or people in Europe drive their cars, their actions have consequences. Th ose consequences link them to rural communities in Bangladesh, farmers in Ethiopia and slum dwellers in Haiti. With these human connections come moral responsibilities, including a responsibility to refl ect upon-and changeenergy policies that infl ict harm on other people or future generations.
The case for action
If the world acts now it will be possible-just possible-to keep 21 st Century global temperature increases within a 2°C threshold above preindustrial levels. Achieving this future will require a high level of leadership and unparalleled international cooperation. Yet climate change is a threat that comes with an opportunity. Above all, it provides an opportunity for the world to come together in forging a collective response to a crisis that threatens to halt progress.
Th e values that inspired the draft ers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provide a powerful point of reference. Th at document was a response to the political failure that gave rise to extreme nationalism, fascism and world war. It established a set of entitlements and rights-civil, political, cultural, social and economic-for "all members of the human family". Th e values that inspired the Universal Declaration were seen as a code of conduct for human aff airs that would prevent the "disregard and contempt for human rights that have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind".
Th e draft ers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were looking back at a human tragedy, the second world war, that had already happened. Climate change is diff erent. It is a human tragedy in the making. Allowing that tragedy to evolve would be a political failure that merits the description of an "outrage to the conscience of mankind". It would represent a systematic violation of the human rights of the world's poor and future generations and a step back from universal values. Conversely, preventing dangerous climate change would hold out the hope for the development of multilateral solutions to the wider problems facing the international community. Climate change confronts us with enormously complex questions that span science, economics and international relations. Th ese questions have to be addressed through practical strategies. Yet it is important not to lose sight of the wider issues that are at stake. Th e real choice facing political leaders and people today is between universal human values, on the one side, and participating in the widespread and systematic violation of human rights on the other.
Th e starting point for avoiding dangerous climate change is recognition of three distinctive features of the problem. Th e fi rst feature is the combined force of inertia and cumulative outcomes of climate change. Once emitted, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and other greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for a long time. Th ere are no rapid rewind buttons for running down stocks. People living at the start of the 22 nd Century will live with the consequences of our emissions, just as we are living with the consequences of emissions since the industrial revolution. Time-lags are an important consequence of climate change inertia. Even stringent mitigation measures will not materially aff ect average temperatures changes until the mid-2030s-and temperatures will not peak until 2050. In other words, for the fi rst half of the 21 st Century the world in general, and the world's poor in particular, will have to live with climate change to which we are already committed.
Th e cumulative nature of the climate change has wide-ranging implications. Perhaps the most important is that carbon cycles do not follow political cycles. Th e current generation of political leaders cannot solve the climate change problem alone because a sustainable emissions pathway has to be followed over decades, not years. However, it has the power either to prise open the window of opportunity for future generations, or to close that window.
Urgency is the second feature of the climate change challenge-and a corollary of inertia. In many other areas of international relations, inaction or delayed agreements have limited costs. International trade is an example. Th is is an area in which negotiations can break down and resume without infl icting long-term damage on the underlying system-as witnessed by the unhappy history of the Doha Round. With climate change, every year of delay in reaching an agreement to cut emissions adds to greenhouse gas stocks, locking the future into a higher temperature. In the seven years since the Doha Round started, to continue the analogy, stocks of greenhouse gases have increased by around 12 ppm of CO 2 e-and those stocks will still be there when the trade rounds of the 22 nd Century get underway.
Th ere are no obvious historical analogies for the urgency of the climate change problem. During the Cold War, large stockpiles of nuclear missiles pointed at cities posed a grave threat to human security. However, 'doing nothing' was a strategy for containment of the risks. Shared recognition of the reality of mutually assured 
Seizing the moment-2012 and beyond
Confronted with a problem as daunting as climate change, resigned pessimism might seem a justified response. However, resigned pessimism is a luxury that the world's poor and future generations cannot afford-and there is an alternative.
Th ere is cause for optimism. Five years ago, the world was still engaged in debating whether or not climate change was taking place, and whether or not it was human-induced. Climate change scepticism was a fl ourishing industry. Today, the debate is over and climate scepticism is an increasingly fringe activity. Th e fourth assessment review of the International Panel on Climate Change has established an overwhelming scientifi c consensus that climate change is both real and man-made. Almost all governments are part of that consensus.
Following the publication of the Stern Review on Th e Economics of Climate Change, most governments also accept that solutions to climate change are aff ordable-more aff ordable than the costs of inaction.
Political momentum is also gathering pace. Many governments are setting bold targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Climate change mitigation has now registered firmly on the agenda of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized nations. And dialogue between developed and developing countries is strengthening.
All of this is positive news. Practical outcomes are less impressive. While governments may recognize the realities of global warming, political action continues to fall far short of the minimum needed to resolve the climate change problem. Th e gap between scientifi c evidence and political response remains large. In the developed world, some countries have yet to establish ambitious targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Others have set ambitious targets without putting in place the energy policy reforms needed to achieve them. Th e deeper problem is that the world lacks a clear, credible and long-term multilateral framework that charts a course for avoiding dangerous climate change-a course that spans the divide between political cycles and carbon cycles.
With the expiry of the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, the international community has an opportunity to put that framework in place. Seizing that opportunity will require bold leadership. Missing it will push the world further on the route to dangerous climate change.
Developed countries have to take the lead. Th ey carry the burden of historic responsibility for the climate change problem. And they have the fi nancial resources and technological capabilities to initiate deep and early cuts in emissions. Putting a price on carbon through taxation or cap-and-trade systems is the starting point. But market pricing alone will not be enough. Th e development of regulatory systems and public-private partnerships for a low-carbon transition are also priorities.
No one country can win the battle against climate change acting alone.
Collective action is not an option but an imperative
Th e principle of "common but diff erentiated responsibility"-one of the foundations of the Kyoto framework-does not mean that developing countries should do nothing. Th e credibility of any multilateral agreement will hinge on the participation of major emitters in the developing world. However, basic principles of equity and the human development imperative of expanding access to energy demand that developing countries have the fl exibility to make the transition to a low-carbon growth path at a rate consistent with their capabilities.
International cooperation has a critical role to play at many levels. Th e global mitigation eff ort would be dramatically enhanced if a post-2012 Kyoto framework incorporated mechanisms for finance and technology transfers. Th ese mechanisms could help remove obstacles to the rapid disbursement of the lowcarbon technologies needed to avoid dangerous climate change. Cooperation to support the conservation and sustainable management of rainforests would also strengthen the mitigation eff ort.
Adaptation priorities must also be addressed. For too long, climate change adaptation has been treated as a peripheral concern, rather than as a core part of the international poverty reduction agenda. Mitigation is an imperative because it will defi ne prospects for avoiding dangerous climate change in the future. But the world's poor cannot be left to sink or swim with their own resources while rich countries protect their citizens behind climate-defence fortifi cations. Social justice and respect of human rights demand stronger international commitment on adaptation.
Our legacy
Th e post-2012 Kyoto framework will powerfully infl uence prospects for avoiding climate change-and for coping with the climate change that is now unavoidable. Negotiations on that framework will be shaped by governments with very diff erent levels of negotiating leverage. Powerful vested interests in the corporate sector will also make their voices heard. As governments embark on the negotiations for a post-2012 Kyoto Protocol, it is important that they refl ect on two constituencies with a limited voice but a powerful claim to social justice and respect for human rights: the world's poor and future generations.
People engaged in a daily struggle to improve their lives in the face of grinding poverty and hunger ought to have fi rst call on human solidarity. Th ey certainly deserve something more than political leaders who gather at international summits, set high-sounding development targets and then undermine achievement of the very same targets by failing to act on climate change. And our children and their children's grandchildren have the right to hold us to a high standard of accountability when their future-and maybe their survival-is hanging in the balance. Th ey too deserve something more than a generation of political leaders who look at the greatest challenge humankind has ever faced and then sit on their hands. Put bluntly, the world's poor and future generations cannot aff ord the complacency and prevarication that continues to characterize international negotiations on climate change. Nor can they aff ord the large gap between what leaders in the developed world say about climate change threats and what they do in their energy policies.
Twenty years ago Chico Mendes, the Brazilian environmentalist, died attempting to defend the Amazon rainforest against destruction. Before his death, he spoke of the ties that bound his local struggle to a global movement for social justice: "At fi rst I thought I was fi ghting to save rubber trees, then I thought I was fi ghting to save the Amazon rainforest. Now I realise I am fi ghting for humanity."
The battle against dangerous climate change is part of the fight for humanity. Winning that battle will require far-reaching changes at many levels-in consumption, in how we produce and price energy, and in international cooperation. Above all, though, it will require far-reaching changes in how we think about our ecological interdependence, about social justice for the world's poor, and about the human rights and entitlements of future generations. since the advent of the industrial era-and the rate of increase is quickening. Th ere is overwhelming scientifi c evidence linking the rise in temperature to increases in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the Earth's atmosphere.
Th ere is no hard-and-fast line separating 'dangerous' from 'safe' climate change. Many of the world's poorest people and most fragile ecological systems are already being forced to adapt to dangerous climate change. However, beyond a threshold of 2°C the risk of large-scale human development setbacks and irreversible ecological catastrophes will increase sharply.
Business-as-usual trajectories will take the world well beyond that threshold. To have a 50:50 chance of limiting temperature increase to 2°C above preindustrial levels will require stabilization of greenhouse gases at concentrations of around 450ppm CO 2 e. Stabilization at 550ppm CO 2 e would raise the probability of breaching the threshold to 80 percent. In their personal lives, few people would knowingly undertake activities with a serious injury risk of this order of magnitude. Yet as a global community, we are taking far greater risks with planet Earth. Scenarios for the 21 st Century point to potential stabilization points in excess of 750ppm CO 2 e, with possible temperature changes in excess of 5°C.
Temperature scenarios do not capture the potential human development impacts. Average changes in temperature on the scale projected in business-as-usual scenarions will trigger large-scale reversals in human development, undermining livelihoods and causing mass displacement. By the end of the 21 st Century, the spectre of catastrophic ecological impacts could have moved from the bounds of the possible to the probable. Recent evidence on the accelerated collapse of ice sheets in the Antarctic and Greenland, acidifi cation of the oceans, the retreat of rainforest systems and melting of Arctic permafrost all have the potential-separately or in interaction-to lead to 'tipping points'.
Countries vary widely in their contribution to the emissions that are driving up atmospheric stocks of greenhouse gases. With 15 percent of world population, rich countries account for almost half of emissions of CO 2 . High growth in China and India is leading to a gradual convergence in 'aggregate' emissions. However, per capita carbon footprint convergence is more limited. Th e carbon footprint of the United States is fi ve times that of China and over 15 times that of India. In Ethiopia, the average per capita carbon footprint is 0.1 tonnes of CO 2 compared with 20 tonnes in Canada.
What does the world have to do to get on an emissions trajectory that avoids dangerous climate change? We address that question by drawing upon climate modeling simulations. Th ese simulations defi ne a carbon budget for the 21 st Century.
If everything else were equal, the global carbon budget for energy-related emissions would amount to around 14.5 Gt CO 2 annually. Current emissions are running at twice this level. Th e bad news is that emissions are on a rising trend. Th e upshot: the carbon budget for the entire 21 st Century could expire as early as 2032. In eff ect, we are running up unsustainable ecological debts that will lock future generations into dangerous climate change.
Carbon budget analysis casts a new light on concerns over the share of developing countries in global greenhouse gas emissions. While that share is set to rise, it should not divert attention from the underlying responsibilities of rich nations. If every person in the developing world had the same carbon footprint as the average person in Germany or the United Kingdom, current global emissions would be four times the limit defi ned by our sustainable emissions pathway, rising to nine times if the developing country per capita footprint were raised to Canadian or United States levels.
Changing this picture will require deep adjustments. If the world were a single country it would have to cut emissions of greenhouse gases by half to 2050 relative to 1990 levels, with sustained reductions to the end of the 21 st Century. However, the world is not a single country. Using plausible assumptions, we estimate that avoiding dangerous climate change will require rich nations to cut emissions by at least 80 percent, with cuts of 30 percent by 2020. Emissions from developing countries would peak around 2020, with cuts of 20 percent by 2050. Climate shocks already fi gure prominently in the lives of the poor. Events such as droughts, fl oods and storms are oft en terrible experiences for those aff ected: they threaten lives and leave people feeling insecure. But climate shocks also erode long-term opportunities for human development, undermining productivity and eroding human capabilities. No single climate shock can be attributed to climate change. However, climate change is ratcheting up the risks and vulnerabilities facing the poor. It is placing further stress on already over-stretched coping mechanisms and trapping people in downward spirals of deprivation.
Vulnerability to climate shocks is unequally distributed. Hurricane Katrina provided a potent reminder of human frailty in the face of climate change even in the richest countries-especially when the impacts interact with institutionalized inequality. Across the developed world, public concern over exposure to extreme climate risks is mounting. With every fl ood, storm and heat wave, that concern is increasing. Yet climate disasters are heavily concentrated in poor countries. Some 262 million people were aff ected by climate disasters annually from 2000 to 2004, over 98 percent of them in the developing world. In the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries one in 1,500 people was aff ected by climate disaster. Th e comparable fi gure for developing countries is one in 19-a risk diff erential of 79.
High levels of poverty and low levels of human development limit the capacity of poor households to manage climate risks. With limited access to formal insurance, low incomes and meagre assets, poor households have to deal with climate-related shocks under highly constrained conditions. Strategies for coping with climate risks can reinforce deprivation. Producers in drought prone areas oft en forego production of crops that could raise income in order to minimize risk, preferring to produce crops with lower economic returns but resistant to drought. When climate disasters strike, the poor are oft en forced to sell productive assets, with attendant implications for recovery, in order to protect consumption. And when that is not enough households cope in other ways: for example, by cutting meals, reducing spending on health and taking children out of school. Th ese are desperation measures that can create life-long cycles of disadvantage, locking vulnerable households into low human development traps. Research carried out for this report underlines just how potent these traps can be. Using microlevel household data we examined some of the long-term impacts of climate-shocks in the lives of the poor. In Ethiopia and Kenya, two of the world's most drought-prone countries, children aged fi ve or less are respectively 36 and 50 percent more likely to be malnourished if they were born during a drought. For Ethiopia, that translates into some 2 million additional malnourished children in 2005. In Niger, children aged two or less born in a drought year were 72 percent more likely to be stunted. And Indian women born during a fl ood in the 1970s were 19 percent less likely to have attended primary school.
Th e long-run damage to human development generated through climate shocks is insuffi ciently appreciated. Media reporting of climate-related disasters oft en plays an important role in informing opinion-and in capturing the human suff ering that comes with climate shocks. However, it also gives rise to a perception that these are 'here-today-gone-tomorrow' experiences, diverting attention from the long-run human consequences of droughts and fl oods.
Climate change will not announce itself as an apocalyptic event in the lives of the poor. Direct attribution of any specifi c event to climate change will remain impossible. However, climate change will steadily increase the exposure of poor and vulnerable households to climate-shocks and place increased pressure on coping strategies, which, over time, could steadily erode human capabilities.
We identify fi ve key transmission mechanisms through which climate change could stall and then reverse human development:
• Agricultural production and food security.
Climate change will aff ect rainfall, temperature and water availability for agriculture in vulnerable areas. European heatwave and more extreme summer and winter conditions. However, the greatest health impacts will be felt in developing countries because of high levels of poverty and the limited capacity of public health systems to respond. Major killer diseases could expand their coverage. For example, an additional 220-400 million people could be exposed to malaria-a disease that already claims around 1 million lives annually. Dengue fever is already in evidence at higher levels of elevation than has previously been the case, especially in Latin America and parts of East Asia. Climate change could further expand the reach of the disease. None of these fi ve separate drivers will operate in isolation. Th ey will interact with wider social, economic and ecological processes that shape opportunities for human development. Inevitably, the precise mix of transmission mechanisms from climate change to human development will vary across and within countries. Large areas of uncertainty remain. What is certain is that dangerous climate change has the potential to deliver powerful systemic shocks to human development across a large group of countries. In contrast to economic shocks that aff ect growth or infl ation, many of the human development impacts-lost opportunities for health and education, diminished productive potential, loss of vital ecological systems, for example-are likely to prove irreversible.
Avoiding dangerous climate change: strategies for mitigation
Avoiding the unprecedented threats posed by dangerous climate change will require an unparalleled collective exercise in international cooperation. Negotiations on emission limits for the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol commitment period can-and must-frame the global carbon budget. However, a sustainable global emissions pathway will only be meaningful if it is translated into practical national strategies-and national carbon budgets. Climate change mitigation is about transforming the way that we produce and use energy. And it is about living within the bounds of ecological sustainability.
Setting credible targets linked to global mitigation goals is the starting point for the transition to a sustainable emissions pathway. Th ese targets can provide a basis for carbon budgeting exercises that provide a link from the present to the future through a series of rolling plans. However, credible targets have to be backed by clear policies. Th e record to date in this area is not encouraging. Most developed countries are falling short of the targets set under the Kyoto Protocol: Canada is an extreme case in point. In some cases, ambitious 'Kyoto-plus' targets have been adopted. Th e European Union and the United Kingdom have both embraced such targets. For diff erent reasons, they are both likely to fall far short of the goals set unless they move rapidly to put climate mitigation at the centre of energy policy reform.
Two major OECD countries are not bound by Kyoto targets. Australia has opted for a wide-ranging voluntary initiative, which has produced mixed results. Th e United States does not have a federal target for reducing emissions. Instead, it has a 'carbon-intensity' reduction goal which measures effi ciency. Th e problem is that effi ciency gains have failed to prevent large aggregate increases in emissions. In the absence of federal targets, several United States' states have set their own mitigation goals. California's Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 is a bold attempt to align greenhouse gas reduction targets with reformed energy policies.
Setting ambitious targets for mitigation is an important fi rst step. Translating targets into policies is politically more challenging. Th e starting point: putting a price on carbon emissions. Changed incentive structures are a vital condition for an accelerated transition to low-carbon growth. In an optimal scenario, the carbon price would be global. Th is is politically unrealistic in the short-run because the world lacks the required governance system. Th e more realistic option is for rich countries to develop carbon pricing structures. As these structures evolve, developing countries could be integrated over time as institutional conditions allow.
Th ere are two ways of putting a price on carbon. Th e fi rst is to directly tax CO 2 emissions. Importantly, carbon taxation does not imply an increase in the overall tax burden. Th e revenues can be used in a fi scally neutral way to support wider environmental tax reforms-for example, cutting taxes on labour and investment. Marginal taxation levels would require adjustment in the light of greenhouse gas emission trends. One approach, broadly consistent with our sustainable emissions pathway, would entail the introduction of taxation at a level of US$10-20/t CO 2 in 2010, rising in annual increments of US$5-10/t CO 2 towards a level of US$60-100/t CO 2 . Such an approach would provide investors and markets with a clear and predictable framework for planning future investments. And it would generate strong incentives for a low-carbon transition.
Th e second route to carbon pricing is capand-trade. Under a cap-and-trade system, the government sets an overall emissions cap and issues tradable allowances that grant business the right to emit a set amount. Th ose who can reduce emissions more cheaply are able to sell allowances. One potential disadvantage of cap-and-trade is energy price instability. Th e potential advantage is environmental certainty: the cap itself is a quantitative ceiling applied to emissions. Given the urgency of achieving deep and early quantitative cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, well-designed cap-and-trade programmes have the potential to play a key role in mitigation.
Th e European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), is the world's largest cap-andtrade programme. While much has been achieved, there are serious problems to be addressed. Th e caps on emissions have been set far too high, primarily because of the failure of European Union member states to resist the lobbying eff orts of powerful vested interests. Some sectors-notably power-have secured windfall gains at public expense. And only a small fraction of ETS permits-less than 10 percent in the second phase-can be auctioned, depriving governments of revenue for tax reform and opening the door to political manipulation and generating ineffi ciencies. Restricting ETS quota allocations in line with the European Union's commitment to a 20-30 percent cut in emissions by 2020 would help to align carbon markets with mitigation goals.
Carbon markets are a necessary condition for the transition to a low-carbon economy. Th ey are not a suffi cient condition. Governments have a critical role to play in setting regulatory standards and in supporting low-carbon research, development and deployment.
Th ere is no shortage of positive examples. Renewable energy provision is expanding in part because of the creation of incentives through regulation. In Germany, the 'feed-in' tariff has boosted the share of renewable suppliers in the national grid. Th e United States has successfully used tax incentives to encourage the development of a vibrant wind power industry. However, while the rapid growth of renewable energy has been encouraging, overall progress falls far short of what is possible-and of what is required for climate change mitigation. Most OECD countries have the potential to raise the share of renewable energy in power generation to at least 20 percent.
Enhanced energy effi ciency has the potential to deliver a 'double dividend'. It can reduce CO 2 emissions and cut energy costs. If all electrical appliances operating in OECD countries in 2005 had met the best effi ciency standards, it would have saved some 322 Mt CO 2 of emissions by 2010-equivalent to taking over 100 million cars off the road. Household electricity consumption would fall by one-quarter.
Personal transportation is another area where regulatory standards can unlock double-dividends. Th e automobile sector accounts for about 30 percent of greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries-and the share is rising. Regulatory standards matter because they can infl uence fl eet effi ciency, or the average number of miles travelled per gallon (and hence CO 2 emissions). In the United States, Carbon markets are a necessary condition for the transition to a low-carbon economy. They are not a suffi cient condition fuel effi ciency standards have slipped over time. Th ey are now lower than in China. Raising standards by 20 miles per gallon would cut oil consumption by 3.5 million barrels a day and save 400 Mt CO 2 emissions a year-more than the total emissions from Th ailand. Eff orts to raise fuel effi ciency standards are oft en countered by powerful vested interests. In Europe, for example, European Commission proposals to raise standards have been countered by a coalition of automobile manufacturers. Several member states have rejected the proposals, raising wider questions about the European Union's capacity to translate climate change goals into tangible policies.
International trade could play a much larger role in expanding markets for alternative fuels. Brazil is more effi cient than either the European Union or the United States in producing ethanol. Moreover, sugar-based ethanol is more effi cient at cutting carbon emissions. Th e problem is that imports of Brazilian ethanol are restricted by high import tariff s. Removing these tariff s would generate gains not just for Brazil, but for climate change mitigation.
Th e rapid development and deployment of low-carbon technologies is vital to climate change mitigation. Picking winners in technology is a hazardous aff air. Governments have at best a mixed record. However, confronted with a national and global threat on the scale of climate change, governments cannot aff ord to stand back and wait for markets to deliver. Energy policy is an area in which the scale of upfront investments, time horizon, and uncertainty combine to guarantee that markets alone will fail to deliver technological change at the pace required by mitigation. In earlier periods, major technological breakthroughs have followed decisive government action: the Manhattan Project and the United States space programme are examples.
Carbon Capture and Storage (CSS) is a key breakthrough technology. Coal is the major source of power for electricity generation worldwide. Reserves are widely dispersed. Coupled with rising prices for oil and natural gas, this is one reason why coal fi gures prominently in the present and planned energy mix of major emitters such as the China, India and the United States. CCS is important because it holds out the promise of coal-fi red power generation with near-zero emissions. With a more active programme of public-private investment, aligned with carbon pricing, CCS technologies could be developed and deployed more rapidly. Both the European Union and the United States have the capacity to put in place at least 30 demonstration plants by 2015.
Low levels of energy effi ciency in developing countries are currently a threat to climate change mitigation eff orts. Raising effi ciency levels through international cooperation could transform that threat into an opportunity, generating large gains for human development in the process. We demonstrate this by examining the impact on CO 2 emissions of an accelerated technology transfer programme for the coal sector in China. For China alone, emissions in 2030 would be 1.8 Gt CO 2 below the level projected by the International Energy Agency. Th at fi gure is equivalent to around one-half of current European Union emissions. Similar effi ciency gains are attainable in other areas.
Enhanced energy efficiency is a win-win scenario. Developing countries stand to gain from improved energy efficiency and lower environmental pollution. All countries stand to gain from CO 2 mitigation. Unfortunately, the world currently lacks a credible mechanism for unlocking this win-win scenario. We propose the development, under the auspices of the post-2012 Kyoto framework, of a Climate Change Mitigation Facility (CCMF) to fill this gap. The CCMF would mobilize US$25-50 billion annually to finance low-carbon energy investments in developing countries. Financing provisions would be linked to the circumstances of individual countries, with a menu of grants, concessional support and risk guarantees available. Support would be programmebased. It would cover the incremental costs of achieving defined emission reduction targets by scaling-up nationally-owned energy policies in areas such as renewable energy, clean coal and enhanced efficiency standards for transport and buildings.
Deforestation is another key area for international cooperation. Currently, the world is losing the carbon assets contained in rainforests at a fraction of the market value they would have even at low carbon prices. In Indonesia, every US$1 generated through deforestation to grow palm oil would translate into a US$50-100 loss if the reduced carbon capacity could be traded on the European Union's ETS. Beyond these market failures, the loss of rainforests represents the erosion of a resource that plays a vital role in the lives of the poor, in the provision of ecosystem services and in sustaining biodiversity.
Th ere is scope for exploring the potential of carbon markets in the creation of incentives to avoid deforestation. More broadly, carbon fi nance could be mobilized to support the restoration of degraded grasslands, generating benefi ts for climate change mitigation, adaptation and environmental sustainability.
Adapting to the inevitable: national action and international cooperation
Without urgent mitigation action the world cannot avoid dangerous climate change. But even the most stringent mitigation will be insuffi cient to avoid major human development setbacks. Th e world is already committed to further warming because of the inertia built into climate systems and the delay between mitigation and outcome. For the fi rst half of the 21 st Century there is no alternative to adaptation to climate change.
Rich countries already recognize the imperative to adapt. Many are investing heavily in the development of climate defence infrastructures. National strategies are being drawn up to prepare for more extreme and less certain future weather patterns. Th e United Kingdom is spending US$1.2 billion annually on fl ood defences. In the Netherlands, people are investing in homes that can fl oat on water. Th e Swiss alpine ski industry is investing in artifi cial snow-making machines.
Developing countries face far more severe adaptation challenges. Th ose challenges have to be met by governments operating under severe fi nancing constraints, and by poor people themselves. In the Horn of Africa, 'adaptation' means that women and young girls walk further to collect water. In the Ganges Delta, people are erecting bamboo fl ood shelters on stilts. And in the Mekong Delta people are planting mangroves to protect themselves against storm surges, and women and children are being taught to swim.
Inequalities in capacity to adapt to climate change are becoming increasingly apparent. For one part of the world-the richer part-adaptation is a matter of erecting elaborate climate defence infrastructures, and of building homes that 'fl oat on' water. In the other part adaptation means people themselves learning to 'fl oat in' fl ood water. Unlike people living behind the fl ood defences of London and Los Angeles, young girls in the Horn of Africa and people in the Ganges Delta do not have a deep carbon footprint. As Desmond Tutu, the former Archbishop of Cape Town, has argued, we are drift ing into a world of adaptation apartheid.
Planning for climate change adaptation confronts governments in developing countries with challenges at many levels. Th ese challenges pose systemic threats. In Egypt, delta fl ooding could transform conditions for agricultural production. Changes to coastal currents in southern Africa could compromise the future of Namibia's fi sheries sector. Hydroelectric power generation will be aff ected in many countries.
Responding to climate change will require the integration of adaptation into all aspects of policy development and planning for poverty reduction. However, planning and implementation capacity is limited:
• Information. Many of the world's poorest countries lack the capacity and the resources to assess climate risks. In sub-Saharan Africa, high levels of rural poverty and dependence on rainfed agriculture makes meteorological information an imperative for adaptation. However, the region has the world's lowest density of meteorological stations. In France, the meteorological budget amounts to US$388 million annually, compared with just US$2 million in Ethiopia. Th e 2005 G8 summit pledged action to strengthen Africa's meteorological monitoring capacity. It is not just the lives and the livelihoods of the poor that require protection through adaptation. Aid programmes are also under threat. We estimate that around one-third of current development assistance is concentrated in areas facing varying degrees of climate change risk. Insulating aid budgets from that risk will require additional investment of around US$4.5 billion. At the same time, climate change is contributing to a diversion of aid into disaster relief. Th is has been one of the fastestgrowing areas for aid fl ows, accounting for 7.5 percent of total commitments in 2005.
Estimating the aid fi nancing requirements for adaptation is inherently diffi cult. In the absence of detailed national assessments of climate change risks and vulnerabilities, any assessment must remain a 'guesstimate'. Our 'guesstimate' is that by 2015 at least US$44 billion will be required annually for 'climate proofi ng' development investments (2005 prices). Building human resilience is another priority area.
Investments in social protection and wider human development strategies are needed to strengthen the capacity of vulnerable people to cope with risk. Our ballpark estimate is that at least US$40 billion will be needed by 2015 to strengthen national strategies for poverty reduction in the face of climate change risks. To put this fi gure in context, it represents around 0.5 percent of projected 2015 GDP for low income and lower middle income countries. Provision for disaster and post-disaster recovery will also have to be strengthened as droughts, fl oods, storms and landslides pose greater threats. Provision of an additional US$2 billion a year is implied by our estimates.
Adaptation fi nancing requirements should be seen as 'new and additional' commitments. Th at is, they should supplement rather than divert existing aid commitments. Northern governments have pledged to double aid by 2010, though the record on delivery is mixed. Any shortfall in delivery will compromise progress towards the MDGs and compound problems in climate change adaptation.
Th e headline fi gure for new and additional adaptation fi nancing appears large-but has to be placed in context. Th e total of around US$86 billion by 2015 may be required to prevent aid diversion. It would represent around 0.2 percent of developed country GDP, or around one-tenth of what they currently allocate to military expenditure. Measured in terms of returns for human security, adaptation fi nancing is a highly cost-eff ective investment. Th ere are a range of innovative fi nancing mechanisms that could be explored to mobilize resources. Th ese include carbon taxation, levies administered under cap-and-trade programmes and dedicated levies on air transport and vehicles.
International support for adaptation has to go beyond financing. Current international efforts suffer not just from chronic underfinancing, but also a lack of coordination and coherence. The patchwork of multilateral mechanisms is delivering small amounts of finance with very high transaction costs, most of it through individual projects. While project-based support has an important role to play, the locus for adaptation planning has to be shifted towards national programmes and budgets.
Th e integration of adaptation planning into wider poverty reduction strategies is a priority. Successful adaptation policies cannot be graft ed on to systems that are failing to address underlying causes of poverty, vulnerability and wider disparities based on wealth, gender and location. Dialogue over Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) provides a possible framework for integrating adaptation in poverty reduction planning. Revision of PRSPs through nationally-owned processes to identify fi nancing requirements and policy options for adaptation could provide a focal point for international cooperation.
Conclusion and summary of recommendations
Climate change confronts humanity with stark choices. We can avoid 21 st Century reversals in human development and catastrophic risks for future generations, but only by choosing to act with a sense of urgency. Th at sense of urgency is currently missing. Governments may use the rhetoric of a 'global security crisis' when describing the climate change problem, but their actions-and inactions-on energy policy reform tell a diff erent story. Th e starting point for action and political leadership is recognition on the part of governments that they are confronted by what may be the gravest threat ever to have faced humanity.
Facing up to that threat will create challenges at many levels. Perhaps most fundamentally of all, it challenges the way that we think about progress. Th ere could be no clearer demonstration than climate that economic wealth creation is not the same thing as human progress. Under the current energy policies, rising economic prosperity will go hand-in-hand with mounting threats to human development today and the well-being of future generations. But carbon-intensive economic growth is symptomatic of a deeper problem. One of the hardest lessons taught by climate change is that the economic model which drives growth, and the profl igate consumption in rich nations that goes with it, is ecologically unsustainable. Th ere could be no greater challenge to our There could be no clearer demonstration than climate that economic wealth creation is not the same thing as human progress assumptions about progress than that of realigning economic activities and consumption with ecological realities.
Combating climate change demands that we place ecological imperatives at the heart of economics. Th at process has to start in the developed world-and it has to start today. Th e uncertainties have to be acknowledged. In this report we have argued that, with the right reforms, it is not too late to cut greenhouse gas emissions to sustainable levels without sacrifi cing economic growth: that rising prosperity and climate security are not confl icting objectives.
Th e current state of international cooperation and multilateralism on climate change is not fi t for the purpose. As a priority, the world needs a binding international agreement to cut greenhouse gas emissions across a long time horizon, but with stringent near-term and medium-term targets. Th e major developing countries have to be party to that agreement and make commitments to reduce emissions. However, those commitments will need to refl ect their circumstances and capabilities, and the overarching need to sustain progress in poverty reduction. Any multilateral agreement without quantitative commitments from developing countries will lack credibility in terms of climate change mitigation. At the same time, no such agreement will emerge unless it incorporates provisions for fi nance and technology transfer from the rich nations that bear historic responsibility for climate change.
International cooperation must also address the pressing issue of climate change adaptation. Even with stringent mitigation, the world is already committed to sustained global warming for the fi rst half of the 21 st Century. Having created the problem, the world's richest countries cannot stand aside and watch the hopes and the aspirations of the world's poor be undermined by increased exposure to the risks and vulnerabilities that will come with climate change.
Fighting climate change is a cross-generational exercise. For the current generation, the challenge is to keep open the window of opportunity by bending greenhouse gas emissions in a downward direction. Th e world has a historic opportunity to begin this task. In 2012, the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol expires. Th e successor agreement could set a new course, imposing stringent limits on future emissions and providing a framework for international collective action. Negotiations could be brought forward so that the quantitative targets are set by 2010, providing governments with goals for national carbon budgets. Carbon budgeting backed by radical energy policy reforms and government action to change incentive structures for consumers and investors is the foundation for eff ective climate change mitigation. Th ere is no such thing as a last chance in human aff airs. But the post-2012 Kyoto framework comes close. 2 Put in place policies for sustainable carbon budgetingthe agenda for mitigation
• Set a national carbon budget in all developed countries with targets for reducing overall emissions from a 1990 reference year incorporated into national legislation.
• Put a price on carbon through taxation or cap-and-trade programmes consistent with national carbon budget goals.
• Carbon taxation to be introduced at a level of US$10-20/t CO 2 in 2010, rising in annual increments to US$60-100/t CO 2 .
• Adopt cap-and-trade programmes that aim at 20-30 percent cuts in CO 2 emissions by 2020 with 90-100 percent of allowances auctioned by 2015.
• Utilise revenues from carbon taxation and cap-and-trade to fi nance progressive tax reform, with reductions in taxes on labour and investments, and the development of incentives for low-carbon technology. 
Strengthen the framework for international cooperation
• Develop international cooperation to enhance access to modern energy services and reduce dependence on biomass, the primary source of energy for about 2.5 billion people.
• Reduce the rate of increase in carbon emissions in developing countries through strengthened energy sector reforms, backed by fi nance and technology transfer.
• Create a Climate Change Mitigation Facility (CCMF) to mobilize the US$25-50 billion needed annually to support low-carbon transitions in developing countries through a mix of grants, concessional aid and risk guarantees for investment under nationally-owned energy sector reform programmes.
• Integrate project based carbon-fi nancing through the Clean Development Mechanism and other Kyoto fl exibility provisions into programme-based and sectoral national strategies for supporting low-carbon transition.
• Significantly strengthen international cooperation on coal, with the creation of incentives for the development and deployment on Integrated Gasifi cation Combined Cycle (IGCC) technology and CCS.
• Develop international incentives for the conservation and sustainable management of rainforests.
• Extend carbon fi nancing beyond industrial sector mitigation to land-use programmes-such as forest conservation and grasslands restoration-that off er benefi ts for the poor.
4 Put climate change adaptation at the centre of the post-2012 Kyoto framework and international partnerships for poverty reduction
• Recognize that the world is committed to signifi cant climate change, that even stringent mitigation will not materially aff ect temperature change until the mid-2030s, and that average global temperatures will rise to 2050 even under a 'good case' scenario.
• Strengthen the capacity of developing countries to assess climate change risks and integrate adaptation into all aspects of national planning.
• Act on G8 commitments to strengthen meteorological monitoring capacity in sub- • Explore a range of innovative fi nancing options beyond development assistance to mobilize support for adaptation, including carbon taxation, levies on quotas issued under cap-and-trade programmes, air transport taxes and wider measures. • Streamline the current structure of dedicated multilateral funds which are delivering limited support (US$26 million to date and US$253 million in the pipeline, with high transition costs), and shift the locus of support from projects to programme-based fi nancing.
• Use Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to conduct national estimates of the costs of scaling-up existing programmes, identifying priority areas for reducing vulnerability.
